China's Long Game in African Aviation

From billion-dollar airport projects to financing and infrastructure diplomacy, Beijing is becoming an increasingly important aviation partner

If you ask almost any African aviation executive what keeps them awake at night, the answer rarely begins with passengers.

It begins with the things that sit beneath the passenger experience. Market access, taxes, airport charges, infrastructure, aircraft financing, foreign exchange, maintenance capacity and the cost of simply staying in the air.

These are the stubborn constraints that have shaped African aviation for decades. Liberalization remains incomplete. Charges and taxes remain high. Airlines struggle to access affordable capital. Airports are often either underdeveloped, badly integrated into airline strategy or expensive to use.

China is quietly becoming relevant in two of the most important constraints in the African air transport sector, infrastructure and finance.

That is the real story of China in Africa. Not COMAC, at least not yet. Not a sudden challenge to Boeing or Airbus. The more important development is happening well beneath the aircraft, in terminals, runways, loan agreements, construction contracts, financing arrangements and state-to-state relationships.

China might perhaps one day reshape African aviation through the airplane. But today, it is doing it through the airport.

In recent years, the conversation around China and African aviation has focused too narrowly on whether Chinese aircraft can break the Airbus-Boeing duopoly. That conversation is premature. COMAC’s C919 is still largely China-centered and faces major barriers around certification, global support, spare parts, residual value, lessor confidence and regulator acceptance. Nigeria has considered certification of the C919 for local airlines, and COMAC has reportedly discussed maintenance, training and dry-lease support, but the aircraft will take time to become mainstream in Africa and much of the world beyond China.

While COMAC is still working to earn the confidence of airlines, financiers and regulators, China has already established itself elsewhere in Africa’s aviation ecosystem. It has done so through airports.

The Council on Foreign Relations has tracked Chinese involvement in 60 overseas airport projects since 2007, with project values ranging from $2.1 million to $2.8 billion, and sub-Saharan Africa featuring among the major regions of activity. Chinese entities are most commonly involved through construction investment, contract construction, acquisitions and leases.

Across Africa, the pattern is visible. The latest example is Kenya. In June 2026, Kenya signed a $1.2 billion agreement with China Road and Bridge Corporation to expand Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, with the aim of raising annual passenger capacity from 7.5 million to 22 million. The project includes a new terminal and upgrades to airside and landside infrastructure, and comes as Kenya tries to protect Nairobi’s position as a regional hub against growing competition from Ethiopia and Rwanda.

In Zambia, the new terminal at Kenneth Kaunda International Airport was financed by China Exim Bank and built by China Jiangxi Corporation, doubling capacity from two million to four million passengers annually.

In Angola, the new Luanda airport became one of the continent’s largest Chinese-linked aviation infrastructure projects. In Mozambique, Chinese-backed airport development has formed part of broader national infrastructure upgrading. In Sierra Leone, the cancelled Mamamah airport project became a warning about the dangers of debt-funded aviation infrastructure that is not clearly tied to demand and national strategy.

China has indeed helped African states build airports that were badly needed. Many African airports require expansion, modernization or complete redesign if the continent is to handle future traffic growth. IATA has repeatedly warned that poor infrastructure, high costs and limited consultation with airlines on airport capital expenditure remain major constraints in African aviation.

But aviation infrastructure does not automatically translate into aviation development. An airport can be beautiful and still fail economically. The danger for Africa is in the development of airport projects without airline economics. Even in markets where the business case is strong, the success of airport expansion depends on whether the infrastructure is aligned with airline strategy, efficient charges, cargo systems, passenger facilitation and long-term competitiveness. This has been one of Africa’s recurring weaknesses.

China’s role in this environment is powerful because it addresses a gap few others fill at scale, the ability to finance and execute large infrastructure projects quickly. China has the ability to bring money, contractors and construction capacity bundled together. For African governments that have struggled to raise capital for aviation infrastructure, that combination is hard to ignore. This is why China’s aviation influence is not merely commercial. It is diplomatic.

To finance or build an airport is to enter a country’s strategic imagination. China understands this.

Its aviation infrastructure engagement sits inside a wider map of ports, railways, roads, industrial parks, logistics corridors and trade routes. In Kenya, for example, Chinese firms have also been linked to major transport projects along the Mombasa-Nairobi-Uganda corridor, reinforcing the idea that aviation is one node in a broader connectivity system.

China’s model has strengths. It can help close infrastructure gaps. It can unlock projects that might otherwise remain unfunded. It can speed up delivery. It can introduce competition into a financing environment where African aviation has often been underserved.

But it also has risks. Aviation projects are capital-intensive, politically attractive and sometimes commercially fragile. If traffic forecasts are inflated, if airline consultation is weak, if repayment structures are unrealistic, or if charges rise to service debt, the aviation sector can be weakened by the very infrastructure meant to support it.

Sierra Leone’s cancelled Mamamah airport remains the cautionary example. The $318 million China-backed project was scrapped in 2018 after concerns over debt and whether a new airport was justified while existing facilities remained underused. It was a reminder that financing can solve the problem of building, but not the problem of viability.

Africa does not simply need more airports. It needs better aviation systems. This is where China’s future aviation influence could become even more consequential.

The next phase may not be concrete alone. It may be training, airport management systems, technical partnerships, air navigation technology, maintenance support, leasing, and perhaps eventually aircraft.

Chinese leasing is an underrated part of this story. ICBC Leasing previously signed a memorandum with Ethiopian Airlines to support fleet expansion through instruments including finance leases, sale-and-leasebacks, commercial loans and operating leases. This shows that Chinese capital can support access to Western aircraft as well, and aircraft financing remains one of the biggest constraints facing African airlines.

African airlines often pay more for aircraft access because of weak balance sheets, currency risk, sovereign risk, insurance costs and limited collateral. If Chinese financiers and lessors can offer more flexible structures, backed by state relationships and broader infrastructure partnerships, they may find a receptive market.

This is why China’s aviation strategy in Africa should be watched carefully. It is not yet beating Boeing or Airbus in the skies. But it is competing in the system underneath. Finance, infrastructure, construction, diplomacy and eventually industrial capability.

For African aviation, this creates both opportunity and responsibility.

The opportunity is clear. Africa needs infrastructure. It needs capital. It needs cargo facilities, modern airports, better logistics, training systems and financing channels that match the scale of its aviation ambition. China can be a meaningful partner in that.

But the responsibility is just as clear. African governments must not enter these deals passively. They must negotiate for local capacity building, transparent financing, airline consultation, technology transfer, training, maintenance capability and infrastructure that reduces costs rather than adding new burdens.

Africa should welcome Chinese participation, but not dependency.

It should use Chinese financing and construction capacity to strengthen its aviation ecosystem, not to create another cycle of debt-funded prestige projects.

The question is not whether China should have a role in African aviation. It already does. The question is whether African states know what they want from that role.

Because China is not waiting for its aircraft to become dominant before shaping the market. It is building the terminals, arranging the finance, sending the contractors, strengthening the relationships and positioning itself in the places where future aviation decisions will be made.

China wants a seat in Africa’s skies. For now, it is earning that seat from the ground up.

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